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This paper analyses the consequences of the planned enlargement on the EU
budget for the years 2007 and 2013. It concentrates on the EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy and Structural Policy and calculates the possible fiscal
consequences of enlarging the EU for various policy scenarios. Enlarging the
EU could be financed without overstepping the current upper limit for the EU
budget, but it increases the pressure for EU policy reform. The main aim of such
reforms is to reduce income support in agricultural policy and to concentrate
structural policy on needy member states. These reforms would lead to a
distribution of net burdens, which was more strongly orientated according to the
relative income of EU members. The burden for net contributors would remain
under control, financial support for needy member states in the present EU
would continue and new members would receive equal treatment from
expenditure-related programmes.
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OF THE EU
THE NEED TO REFORM EU POLICIES AND
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NET CONTRIBUTOR BALANCE
CHRISTIAN WEISE
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the consequences of the planned enlargement on the EU
budget. It concentrates on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and Structural
Policy, on which half and a good third of the EU budget, respectively, are spent.
The essential features of both these policy areas have been set up until 2006,
when the current financial perspective expires; a conflict on the allocation of
funds is expected from 2007 onward. Following their accession, new members
will expect to receive an appropriate and fair share of the expenditure from such
policies. A considerable financial transfer to the candidate countries is expected
due to their low per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and the major
importance of agriculture in the region. The actual size of this transfer is
however hotly debated. The present net contributors to the EU budget are not
prepared to accept the sole financing of this transfer through higher
contributions to the budget. At the same time, those member states, regions or
occupational groups which at present receive considerable payments from the
EU want to hold on to these handouts for as much as possible.
An enlargement of the EU to include 10 new members in 2004 became a
realistic option at the latest when the most recent progress report was published
by the European Commission.
1 To facilitate enlargement, negotiations should
ensure that the accession treaties will be ready to sign by the end of 2002.
Negotiations on agriculture, regional policy and the budget, all decisive areas for
the future EU spending, have not yet been concluded. Although the European
Commission wants to separate the debate on enlargement from that on the next
mid-term f inancial perspective, in other words, from that on reforms of its
agricultural and structural policies, connections between the former and the
latter do exist.
The discussion on the consequences of enlarging the EU on its expenditure-
related policies is often dominated by the expected fiscal consequences or ad-
hoc guidelines for financial policy.
2 In contrast, this paper discusses whether
                                                
1 European Commission (2001a).
2 Lobbyists for net receiving countries and the European Commission, e.g., stress that a solid
structural policy requires an investment of at least 0.46% of the EU’s GDP. ThoseCHRISTIAN WEISE
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there is a need to reform the EU’s agricultural and structural policies and, if so,
how these reforms should look like (section 2). On this basis, the possible fiscal
consequences of enlarging the EU are calculated for various policy scenarios.
The methodology is explained in greater detail in Section 3. Section 4 gives an
overview of the results from the calculations, and conclusions are drawn in
section 5.
The future organisation of expenditure-related EU policies might very well be
considered to be “political dynamite”. However, the discussion on EU
enlargement should not be limited to its cost aspects  - and this is not only
because of its general political and historical dimensions. The issue of, e.g., the
necessary reform of the EU’s decision making mechanism, as attempted in the
Nice Treaty, has already been discussed from an economic point of view.
3 The
economic e ffects of enlargement – expected to be positive – and their
consequences on national budgets should also be taken into account.
4 Academic
studies on this topic have found little corroboration for popular fears (ruinous
competition from imports, “swarms” of immigrants).
2. Enlargement and the debate on reform
Many aspects of the EU’s agricultural and structural policies are frequently
criticised. This section describes the areas criticised that are either of
considerable financial importance or which will become increasingly important
– or indeed first result – during the course of enlargement.
2.1 Common Agricultural Policy
The agricultural sector is of considerably greater importance in the candidate
countries than in the EU-15. In 2000, 21.6% of the labour force in the candidate
countries were employed in agriculture – although a considerable proportion
was accounted for by small holders in the subsistence economy – compared to
only 4.3% in the EU.
5 Even though the agricultural sector’s contribution to gross
value-added is markedly lower than its corresponding share in total employment
in Central and Eastern Europe, it remains of particular interest to see how the
                                                                                                                                                        
representing net contributors concentrate on the agreement that the total EU budget should to
exceed 1.27% of the EU’s GDP under any circumstances.
3 See Baldwin et al. (2000), Jopp et al. (2001), Lippert/Bode (2001), Siebert (2002).
4 See Baldwin (1994), Faini/Portes (1995), Baldwin et al. (1997), Weise et al. (1997), Breuss
(1999), Boeri/Brücker et al. (2000), Brücker et al. (2000), Kohler (2000) as well as diverse
country studies commissioned by the European Commission (2002a).
5 See European Commission (2002b).HOW TO FINANCE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU
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regulations in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will be applied to new
members following their accession to the EU.
6
The central issue in the debate on agricultural policy and enlargement is how
direct income support payments will be handled in the future. Since the
MacSharry Reforms in 1992, this instrument has gained an important role in the
CAP. These payments were introduced as compensation for the withdrawal of
price support payments, which were the most predominate instrument up until
that point.
7 The EU uses this reasoning to justify its present position (Agenda
2000) not to extend these payments to new members.
8 A permanent unequal
treatment of farmers in the old and new member states would however come up
against the prohibition of discrimination in the EC Treaty (Art. 12 EC-Treaty)
and distort competition considerably, favouring the farmers in the present EU.
This is also one reason for the EU’s most recent suggestions for financing the
proposed enlargement including a gradual introduction of direct payments for
the new members. A reform of these instruments or perspectives beyond the
year 2006 are however not outlined at all.
9 If the criticism of direct payments,
which is independent of the enlargement issue, is also taken into account, there
seem to be three options open to the future CAP:
•  No changes to the direct payments: these payments would then also have to
be extended to the new members of the EU to ensure that all members
receive equal treatment. This solution would be the most expensive one for
the EU budget. It would also have serious administrative and distribution
problems attached to it. Direct payments would be problematic even without
the proposed enlargement, because supporting the income of a particular
occupational group is not part of the state’s mandate in a market economy,
and because certain aspects of this instrument’s organisation causes problems
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Following the adoption of the
CAP in the new member states, a rise in food prices is to be expected. If
farmers, favoured by this price rise, were to receive direct income support
payments on top of this, this would create social inequality in the new
member states.
                                                
6 See Tangermann/Banse (2000).
7 In 1999, these new income support payments accounted for half of the expenditure from the
Guarantee section of the CAP and a further 30% was accounted for by already existing price
compensation payments (Weise et al. 2002).
8 However, EU farmers who are new entrants to the market do at present receive direct
income support payments.
9 European Commission (2002c).CHRISTIAN WEISE
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•  National  cofinancing of direct payments: One current problem associated
with direct payments is that they are completely paid for out of the EU
budget. Usually – for example with transfers from the structural funds – 25 to
50% of the costs of such a measure are funded using national  cofinancing.
Without this national contribution, member states with a larger than average
agricultural sector do not have any incentive to accept a less expensive CAP.
One reform option would be to introduce cofinancing, which would have the
inevitable and desirable effect of burdening the individual member states’
budgets, including those of the new members.
•  Dismantling direct payments: Dismantling these payments in a gradual way
could take up to several years. During this transitional period, new members
would receive at least a proportion of the transfers they would be entitled to
under the equal treatment directive. These funds should not flow directly to
farmers as direct income support payments, but could instead, for example,
help regional development in rural areas. This solution would reduce or even
eradicate the distribution problems between new and old members and would
defuse any potential conflict with the WTO. Present receiving countries
would all be negatively affected.
2.2 EU structural policy
Following enlargement, considerable structural policy transfers from the EU
budget in favour of the accession countries are to be expected, due to the
considerable development problems they face.
10 These problems are clearly
reflected in their very low per capita GDP with purchasing power parity (38.5%
of the EU-15 per capita GDP in 1999). The EU uses its structural funds to
support the development of relatively less competitive regions (defined as
having a per capita GDP of less than 75% of the EU average; this "Objective 1"
accounts for two-thirds of the funds). It also supports wealthier regions facing
development problems due to structural change (Objective 2, roughly 10% of
funds) and l abour market policy targets without regional focus (Objective 3,
13%). The remaining resources from the structural funds are accounted for by
‘community initiatives’. The cohesion fund, which helps relatively poor member
states, is also included in structural policy.
In practice, the funds are overwhelmingly seen as a distributive instrument that
can also be used as a trouble-shooter in integration-related policy. Structural
policy offers more flexibility than agricultural policy: by means of the
introduction of specialised supportive economic instruments and of flexibility in
defining selection criteria for financial support as well as in specifying the depth
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of financial support. This has led to the funds being used in a wider area. Many
individual instruments and regulations are criticised for not being very
consistent or for being hard to justify. For many elements of this policy the
necessity for such measures at a community level is not very convincing. This
problem will deteriorate even further following enlargement, as more countries
will become involved in negotiations.
11
From an economic standpoint, the structural funds might also be understood as
an allocation policy instrument, as long as, in practice, they aim to help
relatively less competitive EU member states benefit from the advantages of
being more closely integrated in the EU. The narrowing of financial capabilities
of the regions or of per capita incomes is only an indirect objective of this EU
policy. There are two principal-agent-problems involved. First, the net-payers
cannot directly control the adequate use of the transfers. Today, they have
mainly to rely on the Commission to ensure a sensible implementation of
structural funds. However, the Commission has its own interests that are not
necessarily consistent with an efficient use of the transfers. Second, the EU’s
central institution too cannot fully control implementation and faces a principal-
agent-problem i tself: it cannot implement the desired policy itself (and should
not be given the mandate to do so either), but can also not depend on the
receiving country using the corresponding financial resources to achieve the
desired policy aim because these countries do also pursue other objectives like,
e.g.,  distributional goals. This problem would also worsen following
enlargement due to the increased number of receiving countries and, in
particular, owing to the regional administrative structures in the candidate
countries, which are weak and still partly u nder construction. The following
measures would help defuse this problem and adapt the incentive structures to
favour contributing countries instead of receiving countries: a higher degree of
national  cofinancing; a more predominant use of loans instead of grants; more
intensive controls with effective sanctions; placing conditions on financial
support, i.e. linking financial transfers to growth promoting economic policy
being implemented in the receiving country.
12 These measures will most likely
have an indirect influence on the budget, but they cannot be individually
examined here.
                                                
11 For an overview of reform concepts and a discussion of these problems, see Axt (1997) and
(2002), Begg et al. (1995), Donges et al. (1998), Ederveen et al. (2002), Heinemann (1998),
IBO (2001), Schrumpf/Budde (2001), Stehn (1998),  Tondl (2001) and  Weise (2002). The
commission’s view can be found in, for example, European Commission (2001b) and
(2002d).
12 See Weise (2002).CHRISTIAN WEISE
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Concentrating more strongly on supporting those recipients who are not in a
position to help themselves would also ensure a more sensible application of
structural policy. This could be achieved in two ways:
•  Stronger concentration on regions covered by Objective 1: although the
support gathered under the heading “Objective 1” is the most convincing
element of current European structural policy, its conception and
implementation still creates serious problems – these however cannot be
discussed in greater detail here. One reform option would be to concentrate
more strongly on measures in this area. The scrapping of “Other” support is
unlikely due to political reasons. This area could still be reformed in allowing
receiving countries to have a bigger influence on how they use their financial
resources than is currently the case.
•  Stronger concentration on relatively less competitive member states: This
would give greater validity to the principle of subsidiarity. According to Art
5 EC-Treaty, the scope for support at the EU level is limited, so that the EU
only steps in when a member state is not in a position to help itself. Thus
structural policy financial transfers made to member states with at least an
average per capita level of GDP for the EU cannot be aligned with the
principle of subsidiarity, as these countries are as equally financially able to
support their problem regions as is the EU. At the moment however, member
states with a per capita GDP clearly below that of the EU average receive
only 45% of the available financial resources (Spain, Portugal, Greece). This
approach fundamentally changes the selection criteria used to identify the
area worthy of support. It does not involve structural policy being r e-
nationalised.
However the political debate has instead begun to encourage a softening of the
selection criteria. The position of a region’s per capita GDP in relation to the EU
average is decisive in deciding how a considerable part of funds are allocated by
current support policy (Objective 1). As a consequence of enlargement, GDP per
capita in the EU will sink, as only relatively poor states will join.
13 Thus the
income position of all current EU regions will improve relative to the EU
average, even if no absolute change in value takes place: many regions covered
by Objective 1 face the threat of loosing their support. The EU can react to this
"statistical effect" in not changing the selection criteria and in allocating phasing
out payments to those regions which no longer qualify for support under
Objective 1. Current receiving countries argue on the other hand that this
statistical effect – a changed relative per capita GDP – should not affect the
                                                
13 According to our calculations the EU-25 will have a GDP per capita in PPP of 91% of the
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financial support they receive because their GDP per capita does not change in
absolute terms. Their argument is hard to align with the EU treaty, as structural
policy’s aim is to reduce the discrepancies in levels of development (Art 158
EC-Treaty) and so it is the change in relative GDP per capita that should be the
central criterion. However a softening of the selection criteria cannot be ruled
out. The higher the current threshold (per capita GDP in PPP of under 75% EU
average) for qualification under Objective 1 is raised, the more likely it is that
the current receiving countries can ensure they continue to receive financial
support in an enlarged EU. Though this would go against one of the most
fundamental rules for structural support: concentrating resources on the needy.
3. Scenarios for the EU budget 2007 and 2013: Methodology
3.1 Foundations and data
The aim of the following budget scenarios is to forge the first link between the
debate on the content of agricultural and structural policy reform and the
political arguments about the size, sharing out and financing of the EU budget.
Simplifying or possibly unrealistic assumptions have to be made. There is also
added uncertainty owing to the poor quality of some data (for example regional
per capita GDP in PPP). The scenarios’ results should therefore not be taken as
forecasts, but seen as indications of how the reform options discussed in the
previous section would affect the financial scale and trends.
14
The scenario “status quo EU-15” is included as a control. In this scenario neither
an enlargement nor any reform takes place. This scenario allows us to separate
the consequences of enlargement from the developments that would still happen
if enlargement did not take place. The other scenarios all assume enlarging the
EU to include 10 new members in the year 2005.
15 In the EU-27 scenarios,
Romania and Bulgaria enter the EU in 2007; in the EU-25 scenarios this does
not take place for the foreseeable future. Three scenarios for agricultural and
structural policy are calculated for both the EU-25 and the EU-27: “Status quo”,
“moderate reform” and “substantial reform”. Additionally, a moderate reform of
structural policy is combined with a substantial reform of the CAP in the overall
scenarios, so that there are 9 overall scenarios in total.
The scenarios are based on a modelling of the current regulations for the
allocation of structural and agricultural funds. Only a few central parameters are
changed in the reform scenarios in order to retain the transparency of the impact
                                                
14 Due to space limitations, the methodology cannot be fully described and defended here, see
Weise et al. (2002).
15 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Cyprus and Malta.CHRISTIAN WEISE
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of individual measures. The results are calculated for the first and the last
(expected) year of the next mid term financial perspective, 2007 and 2013. This
should among other things make it clear what effects the gradual phasing out of
structural fund support (and partly agricultural support) and a gradual
introduction of new members would have.
Data from Eurostat is used as far as possible. All financial figures are expressed
in 1999 prices; where necessary, an inflation rate of 2% is assumed. Long-term
UN estimates are used for population growth; it was not possible to take intra-
and international migration into account. A long-term growth of 2% per annum
is assumed for EU GDP, which is somewhat more cautious than the rate of 2.5%
used in Agenda 2000. The convergence of the accession countries’ GDP in PPP
towards the level found in the EU-15 is estimated on the basis of the long-term
convergence of European market economies between 1950 and 1990. Intra-
national convergence could not be taken into account.
3.2 Common Agricultural Policy
The calculation of budget items for future agricultural policy is based on the
European Simulation Model (ESIM).
16 This model contains supply and demand
functions for the most important agricultural products in the EU and allows a
differentiated effects analysis to be made of the EU’s main agriculture policy
instruments in the context of an enlargement involving the candidate countries
in Central and Eastern Europe (analogous calculations are not possible for
Cyprus and Malta).
In the individual agricultural partial scenarios it is assumed that:
•  A fundamental reform of the CAP does not take place (“status quo”). The
direct income support payments are also extended to new members following
enlargement.
•  Direct income support payments are kept, although half of the cost has to be
financed by the member states themselves (“moderate reform”).
•  Direct payments are gradually reduced to zero (“substantial reform”). These
payments sink by 8 percentage points per annum from 2005 onwards and
reach zero in 2017. The new members receive payments that are half the
level of those they would have received under full direct payments. They can
decide themselves how to spend the money, as long as this does not have any
                                                
16 The Institute for Agricultural Economics at the University of Göttingen participated in the
development of this model and extended it, see Josling et al (1998) and Münch (2000). The
results from the Göttingen based institute derived in Weise et al. (2002) are also used here.HOW TO FINANCE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU
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competition distorting effects. These payments are gradually reduced to zero
between 2011 and 2017.
3.3  EU structural policy
Structural policy was split into “Objective 1”, “Other”, “Phasing out Objective
1”, “Phasing out Other” and cohesion funds for the scenario calculations. The
calculations then essentially followed the following principles and steps:
•  Our convergence assumptions are first used to determine the relative per
capita GDP the regions will have in the year 2002. This year, or the time
period between 2001 and 2003, will be decisive for identifying future
assisted regions. It should be made clear that a level of uncertainty cannot be
avoided; this is partly due to the fundamental uncertainty in the convergence
estimations and partly to the poor quality of data for regional per capita GDP
in PPP.
17
•  The amount of per capita support for the regions covered by Objective 1 for a
given member state is higher, the lower its national per capita GDP is. The
relation between both values is the same as can be calculated for the current
support period.
•  The remainder of the structural funds is collected under “Other”. Apart from
Objective 1, the allocation of funds seems to be markedly more affected by
political guidelines (“something for everyone”), than clearly recognisable
quantitative rules. A detailed estimation would fail anyway owing to data
problems. The relationship between Objective 1 and "Other" is held constant
in the status quo scenario to reflect the basic aim of concentrating financial
resources on the poorest countries. All changes to the total size of Objective
1 therefore have an effect on the size of “Other”. The total sum for “Other” is
distributed among member states in the same way as in the current support
period.
•  There is an adjustment phase for regions who loose their Objective 1 status,
in which the funding gradually slows down to a trickle and then stops. As is
presently the case, it is assumed that the support is the higher, the poorer the
member state concerned is. The support sinks evenly and will have been
reduced to zero by 2013.
                                                
17 For example, according to the data and estimations used here several eastern German
regions would be just outside the qualification criteria for Objective 1 in an EU-25. Eurostat
introduced a new method to determine the regional per capita GDP in PPP for 1999; it leads
for example to pronounced shifts in the results for Portugal. This explains some of the
differences of the results presented here compared to Weise et al. (2002).CHRISTIAN WEISE
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•  In addition to the procedure in Weise et al. (2002) the phasing out of “Other”
is calculated analogously here.
•  The cohesion funds keep the same amount of resources and the same
qualification criteria for support.
•  According to currently applicable rules structural policy support for a
member state may not exceed 4% of its GDP. This is measured using
nominal GDP.
18 This results in a partial reduction of the financial support for
most new member states that is in some cases substantial. According to our
scenarios, the member states of the EU-15 receive a maximum of 2 - 2.5% of
their GDP (Portugal and Greece in 2007), although most receive markedly
less than one per cent.
•  According to the plans in Agenda 2000, the support new member states
receive from the structural funds will gradual increase to the full level. Here
they receive 20% in their first year of membership and 40% in their second
etc.
For the individual structural policy partial scenarios it is assumed that:
•  No fundamental change takes place in the allocation rules (“status quo”).
This scenario includes the consequences of the statistical effect as explained
in section 2; this means present EU members loose a considerable amount of
support, particularly in an EU-27.
•  The financial resources in present EU member states will be more strongly
concentrated on Objective 1. At present, Objective 1 makes up about two-
thirds of the funding, in the “moderate reform” this increases to 90%. It is
also assumed in the scenario for the EU-27 that the qualification threshold for
regions covered by Objective 1 will be raised from 75% to 80% of the EU’s
average GDP to partially neutralise the statistical effect.
•  In future the funds will be concentrated on the poorest member states
(“substantial reform”). The threshold for support is copied from the one for
present cohesion funds (a GDP in PPP of less than 90% of the EU average),
even though a stronger concentration is conceivable from an economic
standpoint.
19
                                                
18 This is a relevant point of reference as it was used in the calculations for Agenda 2000. The
use of GDP in PPP is also difficult to justify, as the transfers are paid in Euro.
19 When using the same level of per capita support as in the scenarios with regional
orientation, those member states that retain support now receive relatively high inflows, as at
present no EU-15 member is wholly covered by Objective 1. If applicable, the support is
limited to the amount which is calculated in the Status quo EU-15 scenario.HOW TO FINANCE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU
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3.4 Overall scenarios and financing
The partial scenarios for agricultural and structural politics are then put together
to form overall scenarios: “status quo” for the EU-15 as well as “status quo”,
“moderate reform” and “substantial reform” for an EU-25 and an EU-27. An
additional overall scenario results from the combination of substantial
agricultural reform and moderate structural policy reform (“medium reform”).
This is done because the political ability to put through the substantial
agricultural r eform scenario seems to be more likely then in the case of
structural policy.
It is assumed that the extent to which member states are responsible for
financing this expenditure is reflected by their share of EU GDP. This is already
almost the case today.
20 When the flows countries receive are compared with
their contributions to the budget the net contributor balance for member states in
the different scenarios and reference years results. In the case of moderate
agricultural policy reform, this net balance also shows the burdening of member
states through the national  cofinancing of direct income support payments for
farmers.
4. Empirical evidence
Table 1 displays the main results from the scenario calculations for the EU
budget – which is meant here to consist of agricultural and structural policy
only. In all of the scenarios, the budget drops between 2007 and 2013, in some
cases drastically. With unchanged policies this is partly because direct payments
made by the CAP are constant in nominal terms (thus they are decreasing if
measured in prices of 1999) and partly because the phasing out payments made
by the structural funds to former assisted regions in the EU-15 run out until
2013. Even gradually introducing new members to the full level of support from
structural policy cannot fully compensate this effect. In the reform scenarios,
changes in direct payments and the suggested concentration of structural funds
also contribute to reducing the EU budget.
As a share in EU GDP, expenditure is lower than the value that Agenda 2000
used for the year 2006 with 21 EU members (somewhat under one per cent) in
all scenarios and reference years. A sinking share of the EU budget in GDP is
not so surprising, if one considers the continuing convergence of EU economies.
                                                
20 A discussion of a fundamental reform of the way the EU budget is financed following
enlargement is not deemed appropriate in this study. It must be discussed separately (EU tax).
It would however be more sensible to simplify contributions to make their relationship to the
distribution of GDP clearer. Britain’s rebate is not taken into account as the scenarios aim to
identify possibly existing inequalities in the net burden. Such inequalities might then be used
to justify a rebate.CHRISTIAN WEISE
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The need for structural policy is therefore reduced (not only relatively, but also
absolutely) and, owing to institutional rules, expenditure in the agricultural
sector grows at a slower rate than the EU GDP.
The relatively low budget estimates in the status quo scenarios for an enlarged
EU are also strongly based on the fact that the repercussions of enlargement on
payments made to the EU-15 are taken into account. Graph 1 shows the changes
in the population level for regions covered by Objective 1 for the most important
current receiving countries (Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Greece). The
results have to be treated with caution for two reasons. First, it is essentially very
difficult to measure regional per capita GDP (above all in PPP); a recent change
in the method used by  Eurostat led for example to pronounced shifts for
Portugal (and Belgium) between 1998 and 1999. Second, currently available
values for 1999 were extrapolated using standard values for the convergence
process in market economies until 2002 to better capture the effect of normal
EU internal convergence. Differing trends in individual cases are, of course,
possible.
In total, about 25% of regions covered by Objective 1 (measured using
population size) would loose their support status even without enlargement
taking place. If ten new members join, a further 30% of these regions would be
affected, and only 25% would retain their Objective 1 status with twelve new
members. If the qualification criteria are eased – an increase of the threshold for
qualification under Objective 1 from 75 to 80% in the EU-27 – 50% of the
present regions covered by Objective 1 would retain their financial support. The
statistical effect affects Portugal the least, and Germany the most; although
several German regions are only just outside the qualification threshold. Spain
and Greece would loose such support for relatively a lot of regions anyway as a
part of the normal convergence process, so this development is independent
from the enlargement process. Italy would be particularly negatively affected, if
Bulgaria and Romania were also to join the EU in 2007.
A more detailed picture of the absolute receipts and the net contributor balance
for each of the member states in the different scenarios is shown in tables A.1 to
A.5 in the appendix. Germany and  - a marked distance behind – the United
Kingdom are by far the biggest (absolute) net contributors. Italy is likewise
strongly affected in the EU-27 status quo scenario. France has to make relatively
high payments in the moderate reform scenarios. In these scenarios a national
cofinancing of direct income support payments is assumed for agriculture, and
these are incorporated into the net burden of the individual members states.
The EU budget in the EU-15 status quo scenario amounts to €60 bn in the year
2013, with 10 new members it rises to €77  bn and with 12 to €81.5  bn. In the
reform scenarios, the budget is markedly reduced, though the extent to whichHOW TO FINANCE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU
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this occurs depends upon the intensity of the corresponding reform. In the EU-
27 scenario with moderate reform of structural and agricultural policy the
budget amounts to €68.5 bn. This is however linked to an additional burden of a
good €15 bn on member states owing to the cofinancing of direct payments. Of
this about €4.5 bn is paid by new members and just over €3  bn by France. If a
substantial reform in the agricultural sector is implemented (but the structural
policy is still only reformed moderately), the EU budget sinks to €63  bn. This
would be reduced by a good €3.5 bn, if structural policy was concentrated on the
poorest member states (and not on the poorest regions).
The influence of the differing levels of reform on the net transfer to the new
members is comparatively slight (graphs 2 and 3). This (gross) transfer amounts
to €23 bn in an EU-25 in 2013 (with contributions varying between around €2.5
bn to just over €4 bn in the various scenarios). The transfers under status quo are
somewhat higher, as new members benefit more from the CAP. Bulgaria and
Romania are entitled to a further net sum of between just over €6 bn and a good
€8  bn. Taking the absorption capacity for structural policy payments into
account has a considerable influence on the restriction of transfers to the new
members. Net transfers from West to East would be equivalent to the net burden
faced by the four “big” EU members (Germany, the UK, France, Italy).
Net per capita contributions are the best indicator for assessing how the burden
of financing the EU budget is split (table 2 and graphs 4 and 5). According to
this measure, Germany remains the biggest contributor after Luxembourg.
Inequalities in how the burden is split – assessed according to the relationship
between per capita GDP and per capita payments – cannot be avoided as long as
a substantial agricultural policy is continued.
The status quo should not be considered to be a viable option. This is due to the
implications of fully introducing direct payments to new member states’ farmers
and those of the statistical effect in structural policy. In an EU-25 or an EU-27,
the present EU big four and Spain have an interest in medium reform at least.
They all profit from substantial agricultural reform which is included in this
scenario (for moderate reform, the net burden shown in the graphs and tables
also includes the burden for the national  cofinancing of income support).
According to these results, it will be markedly harder for these five states to
agree on additional substantial reform in structural policy. This level of reform
would be (although only weakly) positive for Germany, the UK and France,
whilst Italy and Spain – according to their net per capita balance in 2013 –
would prefer a moderate to a substantial reform of structural policy. The
remaining EU-15 members would be overwhelmingly positively affected, whilst
the candidate countries would mostly be indifferent.CHRISTIAN WEISE
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The approach presented here to the development of scenarios for the EU budget
in an enlargement differs from how the theme is treated by other studies
21,
because we attempt to both take into account the relatively detailed institutional
rules for expenditure policy and combine the essential budget lines to overall
scenarios. Differences in the approaches – that cannot be discussed in detail here
– are partly caused by the motivation of the investigation. Here, the most
important issues were how the budget would develop under certain reform
proposals (or without any reform at all) and then how – measured by the net
contributor balance – the ability to put through the reforms is judged. When a
cost forecast is instead attempted the assumptions on future behaviour become
decisive. Pessimistic assumptions postulate at least unchanged structural funds
in the present EU-15 (even though such a constant position is incompatible with
the current allocation rules, which can only be changed with unanimous
agreement). Some studies research econometric explanations for the present
allocation of funds, in which the influence of voting powers in the Council of
Ministers is particularly emphasised, and extrapolate the results for an enlarged
EU. One of the problems such studies face is that the size of the sample used to
explain political decisions is very small because the mid term budget planing in
the EU means that the budget allocation is decided for all members together and
only once every six to seven years. On the other hand, differences in the results
are also sometimes due to the differing methodologies used. This relates to the
structural policy issues of whether the “normal” convergence process in the EU-
15 is taken into account, whether the absorption capacity of the receivers is
measured in GDP in market prices or in PPP, how the depth of support in
Objective 1 is determined and how the expenditure labelled “Other” is modelled.
5 Conclusion
Enlarging the EU to include the 12 candidates, with whom accession
negotiations are being held at present, could be financed without overstepping
the current upper limit for the EU budget. Enlargement would increase the
pressure for EU policy reform, which is in any case long overdue. The main aim
of such r eforms is to reduce income support in agricultural policy and to
concentrate structural policy on needy member states. The reforms suggested
here would lead to a distribution of net burdens, which was more strongly
orientated according to the relative income of EU members. The burden for net
contributors would remain under control, financial support for needy member
                                                
21 For alternative overall scenarios see Hall/Quaisser (2002) and Baldwin et al (1997). A
comparative analysis of cost estimations for structural policy can be found in  Axt (2002),
individual studies are also offered by IBO (2001),  Schrumpf/Budde (2001) and
Kämpfe/Stephan (2001).HOW TO FINANCE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU
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states in the present EU would continue and new members would receive equal
treatment from expenditure-related programmes.
Sacrificing further reform would be fiscally questionable, especially as
considerable funds will in future be needed to finance the EU’s new tasks and
responsibilities (foreign policy, defence, aid for third countries [CIS states,
Turkey, Mediterranean basin] etc.). Moreover it remains hard to justify the
inequality found in the net contributor balance for individual member states and
doubtful policy measures are maintained. The more members the EU has, the
more important it will become for EU policies to be transparent and efficient. If
there are no sensible and comprehensible rules for how the burden of financing
the budget should be split, then compensation package deals will increase along
with the number of members and the subsidisation mind set will continue to
dominate the EU. This would endanger the general acceptance of European
integration.
The EU’s new members will not, according to these scenario calculations,
become a motor for further reform. In addition, under the institutional rules
found in the Treaty of Nice it will be more difficult to achieve operational
majorities in an enlarged EU. It would thus be contra productive to put off
preparations for further reform until after the first phase of enlargement. Rather
the EU-15 should agree amongst themselves on the guiding principles for the
desired reforms and then take the first steps as soon as possible. Opposition from
Spain and Italy to substantial reform is to be expected, after looking at the net
per capita contributions. The remaining EU-15 members would be positively
affected or – like most new members – indifferent. It is essential that candidates
should be included in the search for consensus even before enlargement takes
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Agricultural Policy Structural Policy Total
of which: Total of which:
New EU-15
Members
Market Direct 2nd Pillar Obj. 1 Other Phasing  Out Cohesion in in %
Obj. 1 Other Fund Mill. Euro of GDP
2007
EU-15 Status Quo 42.025 14.096 23.590 4.339 29.615 15.015 7.066 3.507 1.650 2.377 71.640 0,77
EU-25 Status Quo 51.940 15.989 29.481 6.470 33.366 11.058 8.247 3.881 6.369 2.997 814 85.306 0,88
Moderate Reform 37.199 15.989 14.740 6.470 28.112 11.058 8.247 916 6.369 708 814 65.311 0,67
Medium Reform 44.877 16.140 22.267 6.470 28.112 11.058 8.247 916 6.369 708 814 72.989 0,75
Substantial Reform 44.877 16.140 22.267 6.470 27.136 11.170 5.465 607 8.905 989 72.013 0,74
EU-27 Status Quo 57.554 16.701 33.265 7.588 31.366 11.793 4.818 2.267 7.938 3.736 814 88.920 0,91
Moderate Reform 40.922 16.701 16.633 7.588 27.828 11.793 8.412 935 5.287 587 814 68.750 0,70
Medium Reform 48.573 16.825 24.160 7.588 27.828 11.793 8.412 935 5.287 587 814 76.401 0,78
Substantial Reform 48.573 16.825 24.160 7.588 26.979 11.966 5.329 592 8.183 909 75.552 0,77
2013
EU-15 Status Quo 38.345 12.894 21.112 4.339 22.355 13.585 6.393 2.377 60.700 0,58
EU-25 Status Quo 46.740 13.895 26.375 6.470 30.217 18.429 7.462 3.511 814 76.957 0,70
Moderate Reform 33.553 13.895 13.188 6.470 27.534 18.429 7.462 829 814 61.087 0,56
Medium Reform 28.951 14.006 8.475 6.470 27.534 18.429 7.462 829 814 56.485 0,51
Substantial Reform 28.951 14.006 8.475 6.470 24.095 18.601 4.944 549 53.046 0,48
EU-27 Status Quo 52.044 14.224 30.232 7.588 29.533 22.309 4.359 2.051 814 81.577 0,73
Moderate Reform 36.928 14.224 15.116 7.588 31.579 22.309 7.610 846 814 68.507 0,62
Medium Reform 31.354 14.306 9.460 7.588 31.579 22.309 7.610 846 814 62.933 0,57
Substantial Reform 31.354 14.306 9.460 7.588 27.939 22.581 4.822 536 59.293 0,53
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.
EU Budget according to Expenditure Categories in various Scenarios, 2007 and 2013, in Euro (millions)Table 2
memo item: EU-15 EU-25 EU-27
Population GDP per Status quo Status quo Moderate Medium Substantial Status quo Moderate Medium Substantial
in 1000    capita, 2002 Reform
1  Reform Reform Reform
1  Reform Reform
EU 27 = 100
Luxembourg 458 207 -174 -242 -236 -194 -179 -263 -266 -220 -204
Denmark 5.320 137 8 -57 -136 -74 -62 -75 -161 -95 -82
Netherlands 15.857 131 -57 -94 -96 -66 -57 -109 -114 -82 -73
Ireland 4.140 128 329 298 97 187 195 288 81 174 182
Austria 8.194 128 -19 -72 -94 -61 -52 -88 -113 -78 -68
Belgium 10.128 123 -44 -109 -109 -82 -73 -122 -128 -98 -88
Germany 81.384 122 -73 -143 -151 -120 -111 -157 -168 -134 -128
Italy 54.723 119 -11 -71 -75 -51 -78 -113 -85 -60 -92
Finland 5.233 117 -2 -50 -77 -42 -34 -66 -95 -58 -49
Sweden 9.027 117 -79 -127 -144 -110 -101 -142 -163 -127 -117
UK 60.003 116 -71 -124 -136 -109 -102 -139 -154 -124 -117
France 62.154 115 4 -42 -103 -60 -56 -58 -120 -76 -71
Cyprus 862 99 -64 -45 -39 -35 -68 -53 -46 -42
Spain 38.214 96 159 64 32 55 -11 25 16 41 -21
Portugal 9.752 87 227 175 160 176 217 161 144 162 210
Greece 10.252 81 307 212 186 205 338 189 173 193 319
Slovenia 1.913 81 -6 -23 -8 193 -11 -31 -15 186
Czech Republic 10.003 70 334 278 301 285 321 262 287 281
Malta 416 66 265 280 284 241 252 264 269 236
Hungary 9.481 60 413 326 352 354 410 321 347 350
Slovak Republic 5.470 58 250 200 218 220 247 196 215 217
Poland 39.249 47 308 255 273 275 306 250 270 272
Estonia 1.266 45 309 257 285 288 307 252 282 284
Lithuania 3.552 40 347 218 270 272 345 215 267 269
Latvia 2.144 36 313 214 254 255 311 210 251 253
Bulgaria 7.531 34 261 199 215 216
Romania 21.255 29 303 151 193 194
1) includes expenditure on the national co-financing of direct payments supporting agricultural incomes.
Source: DIW Berlin.
Net Payments per capita in various Scenarios, 2013, in EuroGraph 1: Objective 1 Population post 2007, alternative criteria
 - in % of current Obj. 1 population -
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Graph 4: Net payments per capita, EU-25, various Scenarios, 2013, Euro
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Graph 5: Net payments per capita, EU-27, various Scenarios, 2013, Euro
Status quo EU 15 Status quo EU 27 Moderate Reform EU 27 Medium Reform EU 27 Substantial Reform EU 27Table A.1
EU-Budget according to Member States, EU-15 Status quo, 2007 and 2013, in Euro (millions)
Status quo EU-15, 2007 Status quo EU-15, 2013
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
Belgium 1.060 452 -597 969 373 -446
Denmark 1.247 125 -92 1.189 91 41
Germany 6.737 4.078 -7.305 6.161 3.285 -5.907
Greece 2.003 3.379 4.358 1.772 2.241 3.146
Spain 4.798 8.110 8.003 4.301 5.920 6.066
France 9.773 2.144 -316 9.001 1.634 270
Ireland 2.122 146 1.552 1.950 18 1.363
Italy 4.522 4.811 -698 4.036 3.841 -621
Luxembourg 46 13 -96 42 10 -80
Netherlands 1.625 476 -1.196 1.538 349 -906
Austria 1.217 284 -276 1.136 217 -153
Portugal 835 2.449 2.364 758 2.235 2.213
Finland 828 335 80 775 130 -12
Sweden 893 286 -820 815 162 -717
UK 4.320 2.529 -4.960 3.901 1.848 -4.256
EU-15 42.025 29.615 0 38.345 22.355 0
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.Table A.2
Status quo EU-25 Moderate Reform EU-25 Medium Reform EU-25 Substantial Reform EU-25
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
1
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
Belgium 1.051 167 -1.180 833 40 -1.182 997 40 -1.016 997 40 -988
Denmark 1.219 98 -346 834 23 -803 1.093 23 -307 1.093 23 -288
Germany 6.694 2.785 -11.127 4.486 1.895 -11.604 5.982 1.895 -9.754 5.982 1.877 -9.537
Greece 2.003 2.920 3.759 1.758 2.842 3.463 1.894 2.842 3.740 1.894 3.016 3.927
Spain 4.790 5.586 4.798 3.700 4.955 3.295 4.351 4.955 4.533 4.351 4.042 3.684
France 9.642 1.707 -2.562 6.419 631 -6.823 8.429 631 -2.843 8.429 545 -2.769
Ireland 2.097 117 1.401 1.549 102 481 1.907 102 1.313 1.907 102 1.323
Italy 4.485 3.733 -3.188 3.392 3.050 -3.384 4.105 3.050 -2.605 4.105 2.514 -3.010
Luxembourg 46 10 -120 31 2 -115 42 2 -106 42 2 -104
Netherlands 1.728 376 -1.646 1.405 89 -1.701 1.688 89 -1.431 1.688 90 -1.387
Austria 1.209 215 -598 942 72 -800 1.114 72 -543 1.114 73 -519
Portugal 828 2.202 1.984 651 2.141 1.814 769 2.141 2.015 769 2.449 2.335
Finland 824 274 -133 651 167 -298 775 167 -111 775 167 -97
Sweden 884 230 -1.160 603 97 -1.321 799 97 -1.049 799 97 -1.023
UK 4.307 1.887 -7.235 2.788 948 -8.063 3.758 948 -6.783 3.758 929 -6.650
Czech Republic 992 1.943 2.292 588 1.943 1.634 606 1.943 1.999 606 1.831 1.894
Hungary 1.780 1.698 2.931 1.248 1.698 1.996 1.212 1.698 2.442 1.212 1.698 2.448
Poland 5.603 5.616 9.404 4.168 5.616 6.959 4.103 5.616 8.165 4.103 5.616 8.186
Slovak Republic 445 768 969 257 768 649 257 768 816 257 768 819
Slovenia 57 82 -57 15 82 -95 12 82 -74 12 309 155
Estonia 163 192 294 117 192 216 132 192 272 132 192 273
Latvia 373 246 540 265 246 343 291 246 470 291 246 471
Lithuania 718 414 1.000 500 414 594 561 414 863 561 414 864
Cyprus 0 14 -73 0 14 -53 0 14 -60 0 23 -50
Malta 0 84 51 0 84 59 0 84 56 0 73 45
EU-15 41.809 22.309 -17.351 30.043 17.054 -27.042 37.704 17.054 -14.948 37.704 15.966 -15.104
EU-25 51.941 33.366 0 37.201 28.112 -14.741 44.879 28.112 0 44.879 27.136 0
AC-10 10.132 11.058 17.351 7.157 11.058 12.301 7.175 11.058 14.948 7.175 11.170 15.104
1) includes expenditure on the national co-financing of direct payments supporting agricultural incomes.
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.
EU-Budget according to Member States, EU-25 in various Scenarios, 2007, in Mill. EuroTable A.3
Status quo EU-25 Moderate Reform EU-25 Medium Reform EU-25 Substantial Reform EU-25
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
1
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
Belgium 966 85 -1.100 773 20 -1.108 731 20 -828 731 14 -738
Denmark 1.140 50 -303 794 12 -724 691 12 -393 691 8 -330
Germany 6.156 671 -11.655 4.177 217 -12.256 3.605 217 -9.743 3.605 96 -9.039
Greece 1.771 1.450 2.176 1.550 1.410 1.910 1.458 1.410 2.101 1.458 2.728 3.466
Spain 4.302 3.156 2.455 3.324 2.834 1.209 2.955 2.834 2.117 2.955 68 -426
France 8.862 989 -2.626 5.974 440 -6.379 4.977 440 -3.741 4.977 116 -3.508
Ireland 1.952 10 1.232 1.465 2 401 1.307 2 774 1.307 2 806
Italy 4.020 2.323 -3.888 3.040 1.974 -4.086 2.718 1.974 -2.817 2.718 73 -4.260
Luxembourg 42 5 -111 29 1 -108 26 1 -89 26 1 -82
Netherlands 1.681 192 -1.490 1.394 45 -1.516 1.377 45 -1.046 1.377 31 -911
Austria 1.125 95 -593 886 22 -770 809 22 -500 809 15 -426
Portugal 754 1.896 1.711 596 1.865 1.557 545 1.865 1.721 545 2.216 2.114
Finland 768 72 -264 613 17 -401 573 17 -220 573 12 -176
Sweden 805 89 -1.145 553 21 -1.296 483 21 -993 483 14 -908
UK 3.897 703 -7.444 2.534 224 -8.165 2.079 224 -6.537 2.079 101 -6.122
Czech Republic 750 3.239 3.339 402 3.239 2.776 251 3.239 3.012 251 3.052 2.855
Hungary 1.641 2.830 3.911 1.175 2.830 3.094 917 2.830 3.336 917 2.830 3.361
Poland 4.575 9.360 12.089 3.335 9.360 9.989 2.713 9.360 10.717 2.713 9.360 10.800
Slovak Republic 341 1.280 1.366 178 1.280 1.093 101 1.280 1.194 101 1.280 1.206
Slovenia 34 137 -12 -1 137 -44 -18 137 -16 -18 515 370
Estonia 135 320 391 95 320 325 88 320 361 88 320 364
Latvia 345 410 671 230 410 458 195 410 544 195 410 547
Lithuania 681 690 1.232 438 690 775 372 690 959 372 690 966
Cyprus 0 23 -55 0 23 -39 0 23 -34 0 23 -31
Malta 0 140 110 0 140 117 0 140 118 0 121 100
EU-15 38.239 11.787 -23.042 27.702 9.105 -31.732 24.333 9.105 -20.193 24.333 5.494 -20.539
EU-25 46.741 30.217 0 33.554 27.534 -13.188 28.951 27.534 0 28.951 24.095 0
AC-10 8.502 18.429 23.042 5.852 18.429 18.545 4.618 18.429 20.193 4.618 18.601 20.539
1) includes expenditure on the national co-financing of direct payments supporting agricultural incomes.
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.
EU-Budget according to Member States, EU-25 in various Scenarios, 2013, in Mill. EuroTable A.4
Status quo EU-27 Moderate Reform EU-27 Medium Reform EU-27 Substantial Reform EU-27
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
1 Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
Belgium 1.051 146 -1.281 833 37 -1.265 997 37 -1.096 997 38 -1.072
Denmark 1.219 86 -415 834 22 -860 1.093 22 -363 1.093 22 -346
Germany 6.694 2.463 -12.140 4.486 1.754 -12.435 5.982 1.754 -10.563 5.982 1.691 -10.423
Greece 2.003 2.764 3.564 1.758 2.739 3.321 1.894 2.739 3.599 1.894 2.880 3.752
Spain 4.790 4.888 3.913 3.700 4.647 2.801 4.351 4.647 4.045 4.351 3.812 3.265
France 9.642 1.473 -3.263 6.419 579 -7.341 8.429 579 -3.346 8.429 507 -3.280
Ireland 2.097 103 1.359 1.549 90 441 1.907 90 1.275 1.907 90 1.283
Italy 4.485 2.927 -4.376 3.392 2.854 -3.961 4.105 2.854 -3.170 4.105 2.277 -3.635
Luxembourg 46 9 -127 31 2 -122 42 2 -112 42 2 -110
Netherlands 1.728 328 -1.819 1.405 83 -1.832 1.688 83 -1.558 1.688 84 -1.520
Austria 1.209 187 -692 942 66 -874 1.114 66 -615 1.114 67 -594
Portugal 828 2.103 1.850 651 2.051 1.689 769 2.051 1.891 769 2.449 2.299
Finland 824 244 -204 651 152 -354 775 152 -165 775 153 -153
Sweden 884 202 -1.263 603 89 -1.404 799 89 -1.130 799 90 -1.107
UK 4.307 1.650 -7.922 2.788 869 -8.592 3.758 869 -7.298 3.758 853 -7.181
Czech Republic 992 1.885 2.213 588 1.885 1.555 606 1.885 1.920 606 1.831 1.873
Hungary 1.780 1.698 2.913 1.248 1.698 1.977 1.212 1.698 2.424 1.212 1.698 2.429
Poland 5.603 5.616 9.343 4.168 5.616 6.898 4.103 5.616 8.107 4.103 5.616 8.124
Slovak Republic 445 768 961 257 768 641 257 768 808 257 768 810
Slovenia 57 82 -64 15 82 -102 12 82 -80 12 309 148
Estonia 163 192 292 117 192 214 132 192 270 132 192 271
Latvia 373 246 538 265 246 340 291 246 467 291 246 468
Lithuania 718 414 996 500 414 590 561 414 858 561 414 860
Cyprus 0 14 -76 0 14 -56 0 14 -63 0 23 -53
Malta 0 82 47 0 82 55 0 82 52 0 73 43
Bulgaria 1.372 184 1.382 1.080 184 838 1.056 184 1.091 1.056 184 1.093
Romania 4.241 612 4.274 2.641 612 1.205 2.638 612 2.752 2.638 612 2.758
EU-15 41.809 19.573 -22.818 30.043 16.035 -30.788 37.704 16.035 -18.606 37.704 15.013 -18.824
EU-25 51.941 30.570 -5.656 37.201 27.032 -18.675 44.879 27.032 -3.843 44.879 26.183 -3.850
EU-27 57.554 31.366 0 40.922 27.828 -16.633 48.573 27.828 0 48.573 26.979 0
AC-10 10.132 10.997 17.162 7.157 10.997 12.113 7.175 10.997 14.763 7.175 11.170 14.974
AC-12 15.745 11.793 22.818 10.878 11.793 14.155 10.869 11.793 18.606 10.869 11.966 18.824
1) includes expenditure on the national co-financing of direct payments supporting agricultural incomes.
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.
EU-Budget according to Member States, EU-27 in various Scenarios, 2007, in Mill. EuroTable A.5
Status quo EU-27 Moderate Reform EU-27 Medium Reform EU-27 Substantial Reform EU-27
Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
1 Agriculture Structural Net payments Agriculture Structural Net payments
Belgium 966 50 -1.240 773 21 -1.294 731 21 -989 731 13 -896
Denmark 1.140 29 -396 794 12 -854 691 12 -504 691 8 -439
Germany 6.156 414 -12.813 4.177 407 -13.673 3.605 407 -10.942 3.605 93 -10.390
Greece 1.771 1.263 1.939 1.550 1.366 1.775 1.458 1.366 1.979 1.458 2.606 3.268
Spain 4.302 1.894 949 3.324 2.658 598 2.955 2.658 1.565 2.955 66 -793
France 8.862 604 -3.619 5.974 415 -7.489 4.977 415 -4.703 4.977 113 -4.421
Ireland 1.952 6 1.192 1.465 2 337 1.307 2 719 1.307 2 753
Italy 4.020 529 -6.180 3.040 2.272 -4.677 2.718 2.272 -3.287 2.718 72 -5.009
Luxembourg 42 3 -121 29 1 -122 26 1 -101 26 1 -94
Netherlands 1.681 112 -1.734 1.394 46 -1.808 1.377 46 -1.298 1.377 30 -1.157
Austria 1.125 56 -721 886 23 -927 809 23 -635 809 15 -558
Portugal 754 1.803 1.573 596 1.789 1.400 545 1.789 1.575 545 2.216 2.045
Finland 768 42 -348 613 17 -497 573 17 -303 573 11 -257
Sweden 805 52 -1.281 553 21 -1.473 483 21 -1.145 483 14 -1.057
UK 3.897 366 -8.368 2.534 219 -9.218 2.079 219 -7.446 2.079 98 -7.003
Czech Republic 750 3.142 3.210 402 3.142 2.623 251 3.142 2.867 251 3.052 2.807
Hungary 1.641 2.830 3.884 1.175 2.830 3.045 917 2.830 3.294 917 2.830 3.320
Poland 4.575 9.360 11.999 3.335 9.360 9.829 2.713 9.360 10.579 2.713 9.360 10.665
Slovak Republic 341 1.280 1.354 178 1.280 1.070 101 1.280 1.175 101 1.280 1.187
Slovenia 34 137 -21 -1 137 -60 -18 137 -29 -18 515 357
Estonia 135 320 388 95 320 319 88 320 357 88 320 360
Latvia 345 410 667 230 410 451 195 410 537 195 410 541
Lithuania 681 690 1.225 438 690 763 372 690 949 372 690 956
Cyprus 0 23 -59 0 23 -45 0 23 -40 0 23 -36
Malta 0 136 105 0 136 110 0 136 112 0 121 98
Bulgaria 1.250 920 1.969 997 920 1.495 854 920 1.620 854 920 1.629
Romania 4.054 3.060 6.449 2.378 3.060 3.205 1.548 3.060 4.096 1.548 3.060 4.125
EU-15 38.239 7.224 -31.170 27.702 9.270 -37.922 24.333 9.270 -25.516 24.333 5.357 -26.009
EU-25 46.741 25.553 -8.418 33.554 27.599 -19.816 28.951 27.599 -5.715 28.951 23.959 -5.754
EU-27 52.045 29.533 0 36.929 31.579 -15.116 31.354 31.579 0 31.354 27.939 0
AC-10 8.502 18.329 22.752 5.852 18.329 18.106 4.618 18.329 19.800 4.618 18.601 20.255
AC-12 13.805 22.309 31.170 9.227 22.309 22.806 7.021 22.309 25.516 7.021 22.581 26.009
1) includes expenditure on the national co-financing of direct payments supporting agricultural incomes.
Sources: Weise et al. (2002); DIW Berlin.
EU-Budget according to Member States, EU-27 in various Scenarios, 2013, in Mill. EuroTITLES IN THE ENEPRI WORKING PAPER SERIES
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